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NOTES
HAS CONGRESS LEARNED ITS LESSON? A
PLAIN MEANING ANALYSIS OF THE
PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION
REFORM ACT OF 1995
INTRODUCTION
In the first congressional override of an executive veto since
President Clinton took office,' the 104th Congress officially en-
acted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 19952
("PSLRA" or "Act") on December 22, 1995.2 Criticism and sup-
port of the PSLRA are widespread. Some commentators consider
the Act to be the "most comprehensive revision of private litiga-
tion under the federal securities laws since the New Deal."4
Others contend that it is little more than a fragile attempt by
Congress to enact some measure of tort reform.5
1 See Francis J. Menton, Jr. & Elizabeth S. Stong, Evaluating Claims Under
Reform Act, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 4, 1996, at 5.
2 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
' The House of Representatives initially passed the legislation by a vote of 320
to 102. See 141 CONG. REC. D1423-01, at H14055 (1995). The Senate's initial vote
was 65 to 30. See 141 CONG. REC. D1415-01, at S18035-36 (1995). The House voted
319 to 100 on December 20, 1995. On December 22, 1995, the Senate voted 68 to 30
to override President Clinton's December 19, 1995 veto. See Anne Elsele, Litigation
Bill Override Hailed But Not by All, NEW TECH. WEEK, Jan. 2, 1996; Legislative
Status Report, 315 BOND BUYER 29811, Jan. 8, 1996.
" Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufinanis, Securities Reform Act Offers Lim-
ited Safe Harbor, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 15, 1996, at B4.
' See Nickie McWhirter, Tort Reform Symbolizes Special Interest Influence,
DETROIT NEWS, Apr. 2, 1996, at A7 ("Promises made; promises kept! Never mind
the quality of the product."); Andrew Rainer, Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act A Step in the Wrong Direction, MASS. L. WKLY., Mar. 25, 1996, at B8 (labeling
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The Joint Conference Committee ("Committee" or
"Conference Committee") issued a report ("Conference Report")
regarding the PSLRA, stating that the Act's general purpose was
to curb perceived abuses in the area of private securities litiga-
tion.6 Specifically, the PSLRA was designed to discourage
"serious injuries to innocent parties" including frivolous litiga-
tion, targeting of deep-pocket defendants, abuse of discovery, and
manipulation of clients by class action lawyers.7 In an attempt
to effect reform, Congress amended two fundamental pieces of
securities legislation: the Securities Act of 19338 ("1933 Act") and
the Securities Exchange Act of 19349 ("1934 Act").
The changes incorporated into federal securities law by the
PSLRA, most notably a safe harbor for forward-looking state-
ments,10 are intended to encourage companies to disclose infor-
mation by limiting the rights of private parties to bring suit. By
establishing a safe harbor, Congress enables those companies
which meet the statutory criteria to escape potential private
causes of action arising from forward-looking statements.
In its Conference Report, the Conference Committee exten-
sively sets forth its legislative intent and its desired judicial in-
terpretation. Whether the Committee's purposes and goals will
be realized, however, has yet to be determined. It is unlikely
that the Committee's lengthy explanation in its Conference Re-
port will have the force intended, given the evolving trend of the
United States Supreme Court to place primary emphasis on the
language of a statute, all but ignoring legislative history and in-
tent.1 Additionally, since the Act applies only to private law-
suits and does not cover actions initiated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"), the Act will ultimately do little
to encourage disclosure."
Act "a distinct step in wrong direction"); Benjamin J. Stein, Tort 'Reform' Is a Li-
cense to Steal, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 1995, § 4, at 15 ("The supposed rationale for
these measures is absurd."); see also Industry Hails Veto Override, Consumer
Groups, Others Opposed, B.N.A. SEC. L. DAILY, Dec. 28, 1995 (mentioning original
version of PSLRA as part of Contract With America).
6 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 730.
7 Id.
8 15 U.S.C. § 77a et. seq. (1994 & Supp. 1995).
15 U.S.C. § 78a et. seq. (1994 & Supp. 1995).
10 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
" See infra note 27 (discussing Supreme Court's trend in securities statutory
interpretation).
12 See infra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing failure of Act to encour-
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This Note will use the PSLRA's safe harbor to illustrate13
how the Act, or at least the Conference Committee's stated in-
tent, falls apart upon critical examination. Part I will consider
the evolution of the Supreme Court's tendency to utilize a plain
meaning approach when interpreting securities statutes. Part II
will explore the Committee's explanation and intended interpre-
tation of the changes which the PSLRA made to the 1933 and
1934 Acts, focusing on the safe harbor provisions. Part III will
discuss the apparent ambiguities and problems with the
PSLRA's safe harbor.
I. SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION OF SECURITIES LAWS
In a movement championed by the "intellectually aggressive"
Justice Antonin Scalia of the United States Supreme Court, the
Court has been reconsidering the role of legislative history in
statutory interpretation.14  Early in his tenure on the Court,
Justice Scalia made it clear that he was a staunch supporter of
the plain meaning approach to statutory interpretation when he
refused to join a Court opinion because he felt it contained an ir-
relevant discussion of legislative history.15 Justice Scalia wrote,
"th[e] doctrine [that a statute's plain meaning is less significant
than legislative history] ... is to my mind an ill-advised deviation
from the venerable principle that if the language of a statute is
clear, that language must be given effect-at least in the absence
of a patent absurdity.""
Justice Scalia's position on statutory interpretation, dubbed
"the new textualism," suggests that the legislative history of a
age meaningful disclosure).
'3 Arguably, the safe harbor is also the most significant provision of the
PSLRA. See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (discussing Act's most notable
provisions).
14 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621,
624 (1990) [hereinafter Eskridge, New Textualism]; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Inco-
herence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 750 (1995) (noting
change in Court's approach to statutory construction in favor of textualism).
' See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,
453 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[W]e are not free to replace [the clear language
of the legislature] with an unenacted legislative intent."); Eskridge, New Textual-
ism, supra note 14, at 623. Justice Scalia's position on statutory interpretation can
be traced to his pre-Supreme Court opinions. See Richard Nagareda, Comment, The
Appellate Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 54 U. Cmi. L. REV. 705, 720-26
(1987).
" Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 452 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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particular statute is immaterial when its language is clear and
the Court has discerned its plain meaning.17 To emphasize a
comnmittee report, floor debate, or hearing testimony over the
text of a statute elevates the view of a congressional subgroup
above that of the entire Congress, which presumably voted not
on the basis of a committee report, but rather on each member's
"plain" interpretation of the statutory text.18 The new textualism
approach suggests that courts interpret a statute through the
use of accepted definitions, grammatical rules, statutory con-
struction, related statutory provisions, and judicial canons. 9
The idea that one universal "plain" meaning could exist in a
statute if Congress would clearly draft securities legislation is an
attractive one. Such an approach to statutory interpretation,
however, incorporates numerous assumptions which, in turn,
would require subsequent interpretation.
The problem with plain meaning interpretation is that
meaning is seldom plain. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once
opined, "[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it
is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and
content according to the circumstances and the time in which it
is used.""0 For example, what is the accepted definition of a
given word? Accepted by whom? If one concludes that the dic-
tionary is the best place to look for a definition, the question re-
mains which of the dictionary's several definitions to employ.
The meaning of a given word may vary greatly, not only in gen-
eral usage, but more so in a complicated statute that uses the
word as a term of art. Should courts look for a word's meaning
when the statute was enacted or when a case is litigated? Con-
text may also be highly relevant. A word's meaning may not be
plain without considering the context, and yet contextual analy-
sis can lead a court to analyze the very materials that the plain
"7 See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 14, at 623-24 (discussing Scalia
and theory of new textualism).
18 See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 14, at 654. According to Justice
Scalia, legislative history is a "frail substitute[] for bicameral vote upon the text of a
law .... It is at best dangerous to assume that all the necessary participants in the
law-enactment process are acting upon the same unexpressed assumptions."
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part)
(citation omitted).
19 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 609, 610 (1990).
20 Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
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meaning approach to statutory interpretation seeks to avoid.21
Similarly, judicial canons 2 and rules of statutory construction
tend to fall in and out of favor. When is a given rule or canon no
longer appropriate? Interpretation utilizing related statutory
provisions does not adequately address the issues of how to de-
termine when a particular provision is actually related, and
whether the prior interpretation of the plain meaning was cor-
rect. On a broader scale, the new textualism approach necessar-
ily presumes that members of Congress, individually or collec-
tively, weigh such considerations more than they would a
committee report or a floor debate before voting on a given bill.
For better or worse, because of Justice Scalia's staunch support
of the plain meaning rule,23 the Court apparently has adopted it
as the predominant method of interpreting securities laws.24
21 Justice Scalia concedes the relevance of context in statutory analysis. See
United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365,
371 (1988) ("A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by
the remainder of the statutory scheme-because the same terminology is used else-
where in a context that makes its meaning clear .... "). For an analysis of Justice
Scalia's support of a word's structural context, see Eskridge, New Textualism, supra
note 14, at 660-63 (discussing Justice Scalia's consideration of word usage in same
and in other statutes, statute as whole, and interaction of different statutory
schemes).
2 Judicial canons are general rules used by judges to aid them in statutory in-
terpretation. For example, canons may involve grammatical rules, allocation of
authority, and deference to administrative agencies. See Eskridge, New Textualism,
supra note 14, at 663-66. Canons have also been referred to as rules that courts lay
down for Congress, to guide Congress in drafting laws which will have credence with
the courts. See Group Discussion on the Supreme Court's Recent Administrative Ju-
risprudence, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 287, 288 (1993) [hereinafter Group Discussion].
2 According to Eskridge, Scalia's opinions influenced the Court's approach to
general statutory interpretation, affecting the Court's analysis even outside the se-
curities area. See Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 14, at 624-25. "iThe Court
has been much more willing to ignore legislative history, [and] has been slightly
more reluctant to deviate from the apparent meaning of the statutory text .... Id. at
625; see also Nat Stern, The Constitutionalization of Rule 10b-5, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 1,
9 (1995).
24 See Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,
511 U.S. 164, 174 (1994) ("Adherence to the text ... is consistent with our decisions
interpreting other provisions of the Securities Acts."); Nathan F. Coco, Has Legisla-
tive History Become History?: A Critical Examination of Central Bank of Denver,
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 20 J. CORP. L. 555, 563-64 (1995)
(discussing Court's departure from legislative history analysis to textual methodol-
ogy in securities litigation); see also Pierce, supra note 14, at 777-78 (noting that be-
tween 1988 and 1994, Justice Scalia's textualism approach has had profound effect
on Court's evaluation of statutes).
Scholars recognize Justice Anthony Kennedy and, more recently, Justice
Clarence Thomas as supporters of Justice Scalia's approach to statutory interpreta-
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Beginning well before Justice Scalia joined the Court, and
culminating in the 1994 decision of Central Bank of Denver, N.A.
v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,25 the Court migrated to-
ward a policy of strictly construing the federal securities laws."
During this twenty year period, the Court began to focus on
statutory language by criticizing all implied rights of action, re-
fusing to recognize new implied rights of action, and restricting
old implied rights of action.27
tion. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of
Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 401, 401 (1994) (referring
to Justice Kennedy as important ally of Justice Scalia and suggesting that other
Justices' opinions reflect this approach); Mark R. Killenbeck, A Matter of Mere Ap-
proval? The Role of the President in the Creation of Legislative History, 48 ARK. L.
REV. 239, 244 n.22 (1994) ("Justice Thomas has characterized plain meaning as the
'cardinal canon [to be looked to], before all others,' ... and routinely joins many of
Justice Scalia's opinions attacking the use of legislative history.") (quoting Connecti-
cut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992)).
2 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
26 In 1982, for example, the Ninth Circuit noted that "[t]he Supreme Court has
rejected [a broad policy] justification for an expansive reading of the statutes and
instead prescribed a strict statutory construction approach to determining liability
under the acts." Admiralty Fund v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 677 F.2d 1301, 1311 n.12
(9th Cir. 1982). Not every Court decision in this era, however, relied on the statu-
tory language. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 386-87 (1983)
(employing policy-based standard premised on flexible principles of statutory con-
struction in evaluating rights of action under 1993 and 1934 Acts); United States v.
Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 772-77 (1979) (looking partly to statutory language and
partly to broad Congressional objectives).
27 Alan R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities
Fraud: A Critical Examination, 52 ALB. L. REV. 637, 648 n.64 (1988) (citations omit-
ted). The Court began narrowing the scope of federal securities laws in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). For a discussion of Blue Chip
Stamps as marking the beginning of the Supreme Courfs trend toward restrictive
interpretation, see Roberta S. Karmel, Implications of the Central Bank of Denver
Case, N.Y. L.J. June 16, 1994, at 3. Looking to the language of section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, the Court in Blue Chip Stamps narrowly construed Rule 10b-5 to allow
as possible plaintiff only one who purchases or sells securities in a fraudulent trans-
action. Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730-31. In the 1976 case, Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, the Court looked to the statutory language and held that scienter was a
required element in private causes of action brought under section 10(b). Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976). The Court wrote that statutory lan-
guage is" '[tihe starting point in every case involving construction of a statute .... '"
and looked to the language's commonly accepted meaning. Id. at 197 (quoting Blue
Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 756 (Powell, J., concurring)). Shortly thereafter, in Santa
Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), the Court again used a plain meaning
approach to find the language of section 10(b) does not indicate that Congress meant
to prohibit conduct not involving manipulation or deception. Id. at 473. Similarly, in
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Court reasoned that "the 1934
Act cannot be read 'more broadly than its language and the statutory scheme rea-
sonably permit.' "Id. at 234 (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,
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In Central Bank, the Court seized the opportunity to solidify
further its policy of strictly interpreting securities legislation. In
a five to four ruling that rejected decisions in nearly every cir-
cuit,' the Court held that liability under section 10(b) of the
1934 Act does not extend to private causes of action against
those who aid and abet a primary violation of section 10(b).29
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy" determined that "the
text of the statute controls [the Court's] decision."3'
After determining that the text of the 1934 Act does not
cover one who aids and abets a violation, the Court concluded
that such a determination was sufficient to resolve the case.32
The Court wrote, "[it is inconsistent with settled methodology ...
to extend liability beyond the scope of conduct prohibited by the
578 (1979) (quoting SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 116 (1978)). That same year, the
Court also employed a plain meaning approach in requiring the SEC show scienter
in its actions based on section 10(b). Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 695 (1980). More
recently, the Court, relying on the text, interpreted the meaning of "seller" in the
context of section 12(1) of the 1934 Act. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 641-44 (1988).
Justice Blackmun commented that "ascertainment of congressional intent with re-
spect to the scope of liability created by a particular section of the Securities Act
must rest primarily on the language of that section." Id. at 653. Emphasizing con-
gressional language, the Court proceeded on the assumption that "Congress meant
what it said." Id. Through the twenty year progression, strict statutory construction
evolved as the predominant approach for interpreting securities legislation. See gen-
erally supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing Courfs tendency to use
strict statutory construction).
28 See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 192-93 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted); David J. Baum, Comment, The Aftermath of Central Bank of Denver: Pri-
vate Aiding and Abetting Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 44 AM. U. L.
REv. 1817, 1825 n.47 (1995). Baum cites the following circuit court decisions that
have recognized private causes of action for aiding and abetting; Schatz v. Rosen-
berg, 943 F.2d 485, 495 (4th Cir. 1991); Robin v. Arthur Young & Co., 915 F.2d 1120,
1123 (7th Cir. 1990); Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 305 (6th Cir. 1987); Woods
v. Barnett Bank of Fort Lauderdale, 765 F.2d 1004, 1011 (11th Cir. 1985); Cleary v.
Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983); Harmsen v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932,
944-45 (9th Cir. 1982); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 783-84 (8th Cir. 1981); HT v.
Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 917-18 (2d Cir. 1980); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef
Co., Inc., 579 F.2d 793, 802-04 (3d Cir. 1978); Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas,
522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 553-54 (10th Cir.
1974); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1318 (6th Cir. 1974).
29 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191 (holding as such "[biecause the text of § 10(b)
does not prohibit aiding and abetting") (emphasis added).
' Justice Kennedy was joined by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, and
Thomas. Id. at 166. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Blackmun, Souter, and Gins-
burg, dissented. Id. at 192; see supra note 24 (discussing Justices Kennedy and
Thomas as Justice Scalia's allies in plain meaning approach to statutory interpreta-
tion).
:" Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 173.
32 Id. at 177.
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statutory text."33 Evidently, the Court chose not to consider the
legislative history surrounding the 1934 Act.
After establishing that the statutory language controls,
however, the Court did in fact discuss legislative history, in part
discrediting it, and in part explaining how the Court would have
reached the same result had legislative history been a factor.'
Not surprisingly, the Court's explanation traces back to a Scalia
dissent:
It does not follow ... that Congress' failure to overturn a statu-
tory precedent is reason for this Court to adhere to it. It is
'impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congres-
sional failure to act represents' affirmative congressional ap-
proval of the [courts'] statutory interpretation.... Congress may
legislate, moreover, only through the passage of a bill which is
approved by both Houses and signed by the President.... Con-
gressional inaction cannot amend a duly enacted statute.
'3s
The Court then cited precedent downplaying the role of
inferences made from Congressional silence.36
The Court in Central Bank not only condemned the practice
of legislative interpretation by subsequent Congresses,37 but also
that of the production by Congress of a documented legislative
33 Id.
'4 See id. at 178. ("[T]he statute itself resolves the case, but even if it did not,
we would reach the same result.").
35 Id. at 186 (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1
(1989) (quoting Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S.
616, 671-72 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting))) (alterations in original).
36 See Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990)
("Congressional inaction lacks 'persuasive significance' because 'several equally ten-
able inferences' may be drawn from such inaction....") (quoting United States v.
Wise, 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962)); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 121 (1940)
("W]e walk on quicksand when we try to find in the absence of corrective legislation
a controlling legal principle."). "Policy considerations cannot override [the Court's]
interpretation of the text and structure of the Act, except to the extent that they
may help to show that adherence to the text and structure would lead to a result 'so
bizarre' that Congress could not have intended it." Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 188
(quoting Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 191 (1991)); see also North Haven
Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535-36 n.26 (1982) (dismissing policy argument
for interpretation of Title IX). See generally John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence
and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into 'Speculative Unrealities,' 64
B.U. L. REV. 737 (1984).
37 Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 185 (stating that "[wie have observed on more
than one occasion that the interpretation given by one Congress to an earlier statute
is of little assistance in discerning the meaning of that statute") (citing Public Em-
ployees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168 (1989)).
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history to accompany each bill."8 Critics of such an approach find
it "confining" and claim that a complete disregard of legislative
history "ignores the realities of the political process."39 Perhaps
Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 187. No inference may be drawn from congres-
sional inaction regarding legislative history because the statute itself may incorpo-
rate all the necessary information. Id. The only time that courts should look beyond
the statutory text is when a plain meaning interpretation of the legislation is " 'so
bizarre' that Congress could not have intended it." Id. at 188 (citations omitted).
"[L]egislative history may not be used to support a construction that adds to or
takes from the significance of the words employed." United States v. Missouri Pac.
R.R. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929). Only where there is doubt as to Congress' intent
may committee reports and other legislative history be employed. Literature on
statutory interpretation, by enacting and subsequent Congresses, is abundant. See
Edward 0. Correia, A Legislative Conception of Legislative Supremacy, 42 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1129 (1992) (discussing intent of enacting Congress in context of legis-
lative supremacy); Grabow, supra note 36, at 737 (discussing intent of subsequent
Congresses); see also Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 300-10, 311-18 (1989) (showing Court's focus on text of
statute in determining duty to represent indigent defendants and dissent's focus on
Congressional intent in passing statute); Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S.
105, 113, 124 (1988) (exemplifying Courtes focus on text of interim labor regulation
which outlined when miners would obtain presumption of entitlement, and dissent~s
analysis of legislative history). But see Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S.
574, 586 (1983) ("It is a well-established canon of construction that a court should go
beyond the literal language of a statute if reliance on that language would defeat the
plain purpose of the statute."); Philibrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 714 (1975)
("'[A] thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute,
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.' ") (quoting
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892)); United
States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940) ("When aid to con-
struction of the meaning of the words, as used in the statute, is available, there cer-
tainly can be no 'rule of law' which forbids its use, however clear the words may ap-
pear on 'superficial examination.'") (citations omitted).
" Marc I. Steinberg, The Ramifications of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Deci-
sions on Federal and State Securities Regulation, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 489, 496
(1995). "Such a wooden construction ignores the realities of the political process,
demands a 'crystal ball' approach from the Congress enacting the legislation, ill
serves a body as eminent as the Supreme Court, and frustrates the effectuation of
legitimate, if not sometimes noble, public policy objectives." Id.
Professor Steinberg has written often in the field of implied rights of action,
critiquing what he perceives as the Court's "unduly restrictive approach." See Marc
I. Steinberg & William A. Reece, The Supreme Court, Implied Rights of Action, and
Proxy Regulation, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 67 (1993) (discussing implied rights of action un-
der federal law, scope of section 14(a) private right of action, and causation issues
raised by Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083 (1991)); Marc I.
Steinberg & William E. Kaulbach, The Supreme Court and the Definition of
'Security:' The 'Context' Clause, 'Investment Contract' Analysis, and Their Ramifica-
tions, 40 VAND. L. REV. 489, 503-39 (1987) (criticizing Court in Weaver v. Marine
Bank, 455 U.S. 551 (1982), for relying on "context clause" and disregarding legisla-
tive history of federal regulatory scheme regarding fraud); Marc I. Steinberg, The
Propriety and Scope of Cumulative Remedies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 67
1997]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
the ultimate goal of plain meaning interpretation is to teach
Congress a lesson. By repeatedly interpreting statutes according
to the generally accepted meaning of their words, the Court
might "teach" Congress to compose its legislation carefully, cov-
ering various possibilities of potential conflict that may arise un-
der each statute.4 ° In theory, such a lesson would be ideal for
Congress to learn.
The Supreme Court's strong pronouncement in favor of strict
statutory interpretation in the securities context suggests that
the Court will give little weight to the lengthy Conference Report
which accompanied the PSLRA. Adherence to the Central Bank
rationale dictates that once a court determines that the legisla-
tion's text resolves the issue, any consideration of the legislative
history would be unnecessary and improper, especially where the
language is neither ambiguous nor patently absurd.41
Upon examining the text of the Act, various ambiguities and
potential problems become apparent. Even proponents of the
plain meaning approach recognize that when the text of a statute
is vague or absurd on its face, it may be appropriate to consider
legislative history.42 Unfortunately, resorting to the Conference
CORNELL L. REV. 557, 560-71 (1982) (explaining that Supreme Court's restrictive
decisions in this area have led lower courts to adopt incorrectly exclusive construc-
tion when express remedies are available); Marc I. Steinberg, Implied Private
Rights of Action Under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 33, 44-52 (1979)
(stating that refusal of courts to imply private rights of action when Congress de-
clines to act in its legislative capacity would result in great injustice).
'0 Judge Patricia M. Wald, of the United States District Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, has written opinions on judicial canons which sup-
port this theory. Judge Wald suggests that the Court is sending a message to Con-
gress that if Congress wants the Court to lend credence to a law, Congress must
make a clear, unequivocal statement. See Group Discussion, supra note 22, at 288;
see also Justice Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 528 (1947) ([A statute is] an instrument of government par-
taking of its practical purposes but also of its infirmities and limitations, of its awk-
ward and groping efforts.").
"' See Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 173-78; see also Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622,
641-42 (1988) (interpreting word "seller" in § 12(1) by first looking at statutory lan-
guage to determine if defendant may be held liable for sale of unregistered securi-
ties); Sante Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977) ("The language of §
10(b) gives no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving
manipulation or deception."); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976)
(defining scope of prohibited conduct under § 10(b) through plain meaning of text).
42 See Steven A. Meetre, Textualist Statutory Interpretation Kills Section 10(B)
"Aiding and Abetting" Liability, DEF. COUNS. J. 58, 60 (1996) (noting that statutory
interpretation is broad inquiry which may consider other elements, such as legisla-
tive history, to give meaning to provisions); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Strict Textualism,
29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 13, 24 (1995) (describing strict textual approach as
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Report to interpret the PSLRA is similar to resorting to a faulty
dictionary to define a word. The Committee's proffered intent of-
ten differs significantly from the statute as written.
II. SAFE HARBOR PROVISION OF THE PRIVATE SECURITIES
LITIGATION REFORM ACT: AN OVERVIEW
When the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
became law on December 22, 1995, some attorneys believed the
Act would have an immediate, profound impact on the daily
workings of securities law. " Ultimately, however, such a pre-
diction will be dissipated by the fact that the Act is a mere con-
glomeration of diverse measures, each reflecting concerns of
various, often conflicting, constituencies." For illustrative pur-
"intellectually incoherent").
See John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Long and Winding
Road to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 51 Bus. LAw. 335, 335-
36 (1996) ("It will significantly alter the way in which private actions are conducted
under the federal securities laws, the consequences of liability in those actions, and
even the standards for such liability."); Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 4, at B4
("[T]he act's implications affect the day-to-day affairs of thousands of public compa-
nies and their senior managers.").
" See Avery, supra note 43, at 336; Aronson et al., Fewer Securities Lawsuits
To Come?, CORP. LEGAL TIMEs, Apr. 1996, at 1 ("Among the certain implications of
the new 'safe harbor' protections are additional litigation over what it means.");
Dominic Bencivenga, Securities Litigation: Experts Question New Law's Ability to
Reform, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 30, 1995, at 5 (quoting Harvey J. Goldschmid, securities law
professor at Columbia University Law School as stating, "through a combination of
poor thinking in several instances and vague drafting, it is going to create a lot of
unnecessary litigation ...."); Menton & Stong, supra note 1, at 5. Most scholars agree
on which of the Act's provisions, next to the safe harbor, are most significant. See
Avery, supra note 43, at 336 (listing statutory safe harbor among most significant
measures instituted by Act). One such provision establishes a system of proportion-
ate liability to replace joint and several liability, with an exception for defendants
who "Inowingly commit[] a violation." PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 201, 109
Stat. 737, 758 (1995), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(g)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding
section 21D1(g) to 1934 Act); see also SEC Lawyer Predicts Bigger Awards in Actions
Over Corporate Projections, 11 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 368 (Mar. 15, 1996)
(stating that amendment may result in higher judgments because more cases are
weeded out at early stage so those proceeding to trial receive generous awards);
Menton & Strong, supra note 1, at 5 (discussing proportionate several liability).
Sanctions are now mandatory for violations of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b).
PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 101, 109 Stat. 737, 742 (1995), codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-4(c)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (amending section 27(c) of 1934 Act); id. sec. 101,
109 Stat. 737, 748, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(c)(2) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (amending
section 21D(c) of 1933 Act). Also under the new law, a lead plaintiff provision for
class action suits requires that courts choose the most appropriate plaintiff to repre-
sent a class, with the assumption that the most appropriate representative is the
one with the largest financial interest in the case. PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec.
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poses, this Note focuses on the safe harbor provisions for for-
ward-looking statements,4" arguably the most important change
to the federal securities laws,46 and the subject of most of the fi-
nal legislative debate.47
The statutory safe harbor for forward-looking statements
amends the securities law by adding a new section 27A to the
1933 Act and a new section 21E to the 1934 Act.48 The Confer-
101, 109 Stat. 737, 738-39 (1995) (amending section 27(a)(3) of 1933 Act), codified at
15 U.S.C. § 77z-1(a)(3) (1994 & Supp. 1995); id. sec. 101, 109 Stat. 737, 743-44, codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (amending section 21D(a)(3) of
1934 Act).
41 PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 749-53 (1995) (adding
section 27A to 1933 Act), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (1994 & Supp. 1995); id. sec.
102, 109 Stat. 737, 753-56 (adding section 21E to 1934 Act), codified at 15 U.S.C.
§78u-5 (1994 & Supp. 1995).
46 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Safe Harbor for Forward Looking Statements, N.Y.
L.J., Nov. 30, 1995, at 5 [hereinafter Coffee, Safe Harbor] (noting that safe harbor
was "long-awaited"); Pitt & Groskaufnanis, supra note 4, at B4 (stating that PSLRA
is "most comprehensive revision of private litigation under the federal securities
laws since the New Deal"); Technology Companies No Longer Fair Game, VENTURE
CAP. J., Jan. 1, 1996 (referring to safe-harbor provisions as "key").
47 Bencivenga, supra note 44, at 5.
48 See PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 749-53 (1995), codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 27A to 1933 Act); id.
sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 753-56, codified at 15 U.S.C. §78u-5 (1994 & Supp. 1995)
(adding section 21E to 1934 Act); see also infra notes 53-58 and accompanying text
(discussing exclusions under statute); infra note 54 and accompanying text
(discussing to whom statute applies). The safe harbor provision reads as follows:
Except as provided in subsection (b), in any private action arising under
this title that is based on an untrue statement of a material fact or omis-
sion of a material fact necessary to make the statement not misleading, a
person referred to in subsection (a) shall not be liable with respect to any
forward-looking statement, whether written or oral, if and to the extent
that -
(A) the forward-looking statement is -
(i) identified as a forward-looking statement, and is accompanied
by meaningful cautionary statements identifying important fac-
tors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those
in the forward-looking statement; or
(ii) immaterial; or
(B) the plaintiff fails to prove that the forward-looking statement -
(i) if made by a natural person, was made with actual knowledge
by that person that the statement was false or misleading; or
(ii) if made by a business entity; was -
(I) made by or with the approval of an executive officer of
that entity, and
(II) made or approved by such officer with actual knowledge
by that officer that the statement was false or misleading.
This language was not the first attempt at legislation aimed at creating a meaning-
ful safe harbor for forward-looking statements. Long before the numerous drafts
and suggestions that led to the enactment of this provision, the SEC promulgated
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ence Committee maintains that the safe harbor provision helps
to preserve the integrity of private securities litigation. Whether
truly an epidemic or merely a conglomeration of one-sided anec-
dotal evidence, the threat of abusive securities litigation and fear
of open-ended liability may have discouraged issuers from dis-
seminating critical market information needed by investors to
make educated business decisions. Alleged abusive practices
which the Committee suggests Congress was responding to in-
clude:
(1) the routine filing of lawsuits against issuers of securities and
others whenever there is a significant change in an issuer's
stock price, without regard to any underlying culpability of the
issuer, and with only faint hope that the discovery process
might lead eventually to some plausible cause of action; (2) the
targeting of deep pocket defendants, including accountants, un-
derwriters, and individuals who may be covered by insurance,
without regard to their actual culpability; (3) the abuse of the
discovery process to impose costs so burdensome that it is often
economical for the victimized party to settle; and (4) the ma-
nipulation by class action lawyers of the clients whom they pur-
portedly represent.49
The Conference Committee posited that the PSLRA would
have broad effects. Most notably, the Committee maintained
that the Act would protect both investors and issuers from abu-
sive securities litigation." In addition, it claimed that the
PSLRA restricts liability to those individuals who knowingly
violate securities laws and cause damage.51 This new protection
Rule 175 under the 1933 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 230.175 (1996), and Rule 3b-6 under the
1934 Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (1994), that provided a safe harbor for certain for-
ward-looking statements made, reaffirmed, or later published with a reasonable
basis in good faith. These Rules did not, however, result in meaningful protection
from liability for issuing companies with provisions drafted in accordance with
them. See Avery, supra note 43, at 354 n.137 (discussing 1979 safe harbor). While,
in theory, the Rules protected issuers from liability for disclosing projections, they
did not protect issuers from strike suits which arose when the projection as to the
future state of the company was not realized. The potential for such an expansive
interpretation of the Rules resulted in the inclusion of a safe harbor provision by the
Conference Committee as part of the PSLRA.
4 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 730.
5" Id. (commenting that "[private securities litigation] promote[s] public and
global confidence in our capital markets and help[s] to deter wrongdoing and to
guarantee that corporate officers, auditors, directors, lawyers and others properly
perform their jobs").51 Id. at 32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731 ("It protects outside direc-
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afforded by the PSLRA to non-knowing individuals might en-
courage companies to provide more forward-looking information
upon which investors may rely. Before disseminating any new
information, however, an issuing company must first determine
whether the disclosure would be encompassed by the Act. If so,
the safe harbor protects the company from suit by private indi-
viduals.
First and foremost, the Act applies only to a "forward-
looking statement."52 To fit within the statutorily defined term of
art, a statement must contain one of the following items: (1) a
projection of revenues, income, earnings per share, or other
forms of financial items; (2) management's future plans and ob-
jectives for operations; (3) future economic performance; (4) as-
sumptions underlying or relating to the above; (5) a report from
an outside reviewer assessing a forward-looking statement; or (6)
some other projection or estimate that the SEC may later spec-
ify.53 After satisfying the definition of a forward-looking state-
ment, however, the issuer or related individual54 must still over-
come several hurdles in order to escape potential liability.
The identity of the speaker is necessary to determine if the
forward-looking statement is covered by the Act. An individual
who makes a forward-looking statement must either be an issuer
subject to the reporting requirements of section 13(a) or section
15(d) of the 1934 Act, someone acting on behalf of the issuer (i.e.
an officer, director, or employee), an outside reviewer retained by
the issuer making a statement on the issuer's behalf, or an un-
derwriter with respect to information provided either directly or
indirectly by the issuer.55
tors, and others who may be sued for non-knowing securities law violations, from
liability for damage actually caused by others.").52 PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 749 (1995), codified at 15
U.S.C. § 77z-2(a) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 27A(a) to 1933 Act); id. sec.
102, 109 Stat. 737, 753, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(a) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding
section 21E(a) to 1934 Act).
PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 752 (1995), codified at 15
U.S.C. § 77z-2(i)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 27A(i)(1) to 1933 Act); id.
sec. 102 , 109 Stat. 737, 755-56, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(i)(1) (1994 & Supp.
1995) (adding 21E(i)(1) to 1934 Act); see Avery, supra note 43, at 366 n.141.
4 See infra note 55 and accompanying text (explaining to whom safe harbor
may apply)
5- PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 749 (1995), codified at 15
U.S.C. § 77z-2(a) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 27A(a) 1933 Act); id. sec. 102,
109 Stat. 737, 753, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(a) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding sec-
tion 21E(a) to 1934 Act); see supra note 48 (providing text of applicability provision).
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The safe harbor also has certain exclusions. It does not ap-
ply to forward-looking statements made in conjunction with par-
ticular documents, including certified financial statements pre-
pared in accordance with generally accepted accounting
principles, initial public offering registration statements, and
beneficial ownership filings." Further, the safe harbor is not
applicable to forward-looking statements issued in connection
with several types of transactions including tender offers, roll-up
transactions, and going private transactions.17 Lastly, if the is-
suer has been convicted of securities fraud or the subject of an
SEC administrative order within the three years prior to the
statement, such statement is not covered by the Act.58
After avoiding the numerous exclusions, a forward-looking
statement must then fit within one of two prongs of the Act's bi-
furcated analysis: "(A) the forward-looking statement
is ... [identified and] accompanied by meaningful cautionary
statements ... or ... [is] immaterial; or (B) the plaintiff fails to
prove that the forward-looking statement ... was made with ac-
tual knowledge ... that the statement was false or misleading." 9
If either prong is satisfied, the maker of the statement is pro-
tected from private litigation under both the 1933 Act and the
Additionally, the Committee Report specifies to whom the statute applies. H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 45 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 741. Re-
garding underwriters, only information "derived from" issuers fulfills the statutory
requirement because underwriters are typically viewed as adversarial to issuers. Id.
at 45, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 744. The Report specifically denies safe
harbor protection to forward-looking statements made in conjunction with a broker's
sales practices. Id.
" PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 749-50 (1995), codified at
15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(b) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding 27A(b) 1933 Act); id. sec. 102, 109
Stat. 737, 753-54, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(b) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding sec-
tion 21E(b) to 1934 Act); see supra note 46 (providing text of provision).
57 PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 749-50 (1995), codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(b) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding 27A(b) 1933 Act); id. sec. 102,
109 Stat. 737, 753-54, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(b) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding
section 21E(b) to 1934 Act).
PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 750 (1995), codified at
15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(b) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding 27A(b) 1933 Act); id. sec. 102, 109
Stat. 737, 753-54, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(b) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding sec-
tion 21E(b) to 1934 Act).
69 PSLRA, sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 750 (1995), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)
(1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 27A(c)(1) to 1933 Act); id. sec. 102, 109 Stat.
737, 754, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section
21E(c)(1) to 1934 Act); see H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 44 (1995), reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 743; Coffee, Safe Harbor, supra note 46, at 5.
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1934 Act.6" Such a flexible safe harbor was designed to cover a
broad class of issuers who seek to take advantage of the safe
harbor's protection.6 This statutory protection, however, may
actually create numerous problems and extensive litigation, as
discussed below.62
The first prong protects the maker of a written or oral63 for-
ward-looking statement from private liability when the state-
ment is "immaterial," or is identified as forward-looking and is
accompanied by "meaningful cautionary statements identifying
important factors that could cause actual results to differ mate-
rially" from those predicted in the statement." The Conference
Committee maintains that under this prong, mere "boilerplate
warnings will not suffice."" A meaningful cautionary statement,
according to the Committee, is one which conveys substantive in-
formation regarding factors that "realistically could cause results
to differ materially from those projected."66 The Committee
classifies as "important" those factors that are relevant to the
projections and that are of such a nature that they could affect
whether those projections do in fact occur.67
The Committee notes that while it expects cautionary
See Coffee, Safe Harbor, supra note 46, at 5 (noting that use of disjunctive
indicates statement will be protected if either prong is satisfied). It is important to
remember, however, that nothing in the PSLRA changes or diminishes the enforce-
ment powers of the SEC. See infra note 96 (discussing SEC's enforcement powers
under Rule 10b-5).
6' H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 43 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 742.
See infra notes 76-102 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguities and
potential problems).
63 "[T]he Conference Committee has provided for an optional, more flexible rule
for oral forward-looking statements that will facilitate these types of oral communi-
cations by an issuer while still providing to the public information it would have re-
ceived if the forward-looking statement was written." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369,
at 45 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 744. This oral safe harbor, how-
ever, is limited to the "issuers or the officers, directors, or employees of the issuer
acting on the issuer's behalf." Id. For further elaboration on oral statements satisfy-
ing the safe harbor protection, see Coffee, Safe Harbor, supra note 46, at 5.
PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 750 (1995), codified at 15
U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 27A(c)(1)(A) 1933 Act);
id. sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 754, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A) (1994 & Supp.
1995) (adding section 21E(c)(1)(A) to 1934 Act).
H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 43 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 742.
66 Id. (providing example of statement containing "information about the is-
suer's business").
67 Id. at 43-44, reprinted in 1995 U.S.O.C.A.N. 730, 742-43.
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statements to identify important factors that could cause mate-
rially different results from those predicted, it does not intend
the Act to require identification of all such factors. 8 Thus, a
cautionary statement is not removed from safe harbor protection
merely because it fails to identify the particular factor which ul-
timately prevents the statement from reaching its projected re-
sult." Additionally, the first prong makes no mention of the is-
suer's intent. Therefore, the Committee maintains that a court
may decide a motion to dismiss by considering the cautionary
statement and the forward-looking statement without consider-
ing the defendant's state of mind.70 Further, an immaterial for-
ward-looking statement is not actionable.7'
Alternatively, the forward-looking statement may fall within
the second prong, which requires courts to consider the state of
mind of its maker.72 This "actual knowledge" prong protects the
speaker from liability if the plaintiff does not meet the burden of
proving that the statement was made with actual knowledge
that it was false or misleading.73 The Act also provides that
'mid.
£9 John C. Coffee, Jr., Speed Bumps or Revolution?: A Preliminary Evaluation
of the 'Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995', in 953 REFORM: LITIGATING
AND BESPEAKING CAUTION UNDER THE NEW SECURITIES LAW 645, 651-52 (Pract. L.
Inst. ed. 1996) (noting that legislative history does not support interpretation of Act
that "meaningfiul cautionary statements" must identify principal reasons that were
most likely to cause actual results to differ from predicted outcomes); Julia B.
Strickland & Mary D. Manesis, Litigating a Safe Harbor: The Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 and the Bespeaks Caution Doctrine, in SWEEPING
REFORM 147 (Pract. L. Inst. ed., 1996) (stating that "failure to identify the particular
factor that prevented the forward looking statement from being realized does not
preclude protection under the safe harbor").
70 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 44 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 743 (stating that "[c]ourts should not examine the state of mind" of the issuer).
7' See supra note 48 and accompanying text (providing relevant statutory pro-
vision).
72 PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 750 (1995), codified at 15
U.S.C. § 77z-2(c) (1)(B) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 27A(c)(1)(B) to 1933
Act); id. sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 754, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B) (1994 &
Supp. 1995) (adding section 21E(c)(1)(B) to 1934 Act); see also H.R. CoNF. REP. 104-
369, at 44 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 743. Several authors discuss
the second prong's focus on state of mind. See, e.g., Strickland & Manesis, supra
note 69; Joel I. Greenberg et al., Forward Looking Statements: Safe Harbor Provi-
sions of Federal Act Create Controversy, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 17, 1996.
73 See PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 750 (1995), codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c) (1)(B) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 27A(c)(1)(B) to
1933 Act); id. sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 754, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B)
(1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 21E(c)(1)(B) to 1934 Act).
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when a statement is made by a business entity, the plaintiff
must prove that the statement was made by or with the approval
of an executive officer of the entity, and that such executive offi-
cer had actual knowledge that the statement was false or mis-
leading.74 Significantly, the Committee also notes that the Act
itself provides no duty to update forward-looking statements.75
III. A PLAIN MEANING APPROACH-AmBIGUITIES AND POTENTIAL
PROBLEMS
If the Supreme Court has been trying to teach Congress a
lesson, it has all but been ignored. The PSLRA is far from being
a clear expression of legislation drafted in such a way that the
reader may employ common definitions to understand the Act. 76
The Conference Report, if it accurately reflects Congress' intent,
is at times inconsistent with the Act itself. Remaining focused
on the safe harbor, the Act leaves open several important ques-
tions which, if answered according to the Supreme Court's trend
in statutory interpretation, may have significantly different re-
sults from those which the Committee stated that it intended.
Even President Clinton, in his veto message, indicated his
support for the language of the Act creating the safe harbor, but
not for the explanation given to the provision by the Conference
Committee.77 Without pin-pointing a specific section, the Presi-
74 PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 750 (1995), codified at
15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c) (1)(B)(ii) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 27A(c)(1)(B)(ii) to
1933 Act); id. sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 754, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B)(ii)
(1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 21E(c)(1)(B)(ii) to 1934 Act).
75 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 46 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 745 (noting provision does not impose any duty to update forward-looking
statements); see PSLRA, sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 751 (1995), codified at 15 U.S.C. §
77z-2(d) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 27A(d) to 1933 Act); id. sec. 102, 109
Stat. 737, 755, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(d) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section
21E(d) to 1934 Act).
76 See supra notes 50-62 and accompanying text (discussing Committee's in-
tended interpretation of Act). According to A. Jared Silverman, the former chief of
the New Jersey Bureau of Securities, "'[w]e're in a grey area .... What Congress has
done is really outline a structure, then put a framework out. Someone else has to
put in the plumbing and the electricity. It may be the courts, it may be the SEC, or
it may be a combination.' " Russ Bleemer, Securities Law Changes Welcomed, But
Caution Reigns, N.J. L.J., Jan. 1, 1996, at 3. Based on the uncertainty, attorneys are
reluctant to advise corporate clients to test the safe harbor. See id. (quoting one
New Jersey attorney as stating, " '[our advice for a long time has been not to in-
clude [forward looking statements]' in reporting materials. Even with the reforms ...
'it's still safer to avoid making [them].' ").
77 See 141 CONG. REC. H15214, H15215 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995).
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dent indicated that the Conference Report weakened the cau-
tionary language required for a forward-looking statement to be
protected by the safe harbor.78 President Clinton's concerns may
prove to be unwarranted. If lower courts and, ultimately, the
Supreme Court continue the trend of strictly interpreting secu-
rities legislation, the Committee's language will prove to be mere
surplusage.
A. Ambiguities
The application of a plain meaning analysis to the PSLRA
highlights certain important ambiguities. Most notably, the Act
calls for "meaningful" disclosure of "important" factors.79 In-
cluded within the safe harbor are statements identified as for-
ward-looking and accompanied by meaningful cautionary lan-
guage." The Act is unclear as to whether the speaker must
identify the factors that are most likely to cause actual results to
differ from projected ones, or if it is enough that only some
"important" factors are identified.81 Between these alternatives
lies an enormous range of possibilities yet to be determined. Ab-
sent further guidance, a company will undertake great risk by
testing the waters of the safe harbor. Over time, either through
a series of litigation or through SEC promulgated rules, a stan-
dard will likely develop defining what is "important" and how
much of this "important" information must be disclosed. For the
moment, one can only hypothesize, and would be wise to proceed
with caution in relying upon anything more than a conservative
interpretation.
78 Id.
79 PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 750 (1995) codified at 15
U.S.C. §77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 27A(c)(1)(A)(i) to 1933
Act); id. sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 754 (1995), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i)
(1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 21E(c)(1)(A)(i) to 1934 Act).
so PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 750 (1995) codified at 15
U.S.C. §77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 27A(c)(1)(A)(i) to 1933
Act); id. sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 754 (1995), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i)
(1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 21E(c)(1)(A)(i) to 1934 Act).
81 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Securities Litigation Reform Act: Emerging Issues,
N.Y. L.J., Feb. 29, 1996, at 5, 35 [hereinafter Coffee, Emerging Issues) (noting that
adjective "meaningful" could convey either idea of honest attempt intended to con-
vey some of most important factors or that only some information must be pro-
vided). But see Greenberg et al., supra note 72, at 11 (noting that "while it is clear
that disclosure of all factors that could cause the forward-looking statement not to
be realized is not required, a good faith effort should be made to identify the most
important factors").
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For the brave issuers willing to risk possible private liabil-
ity, ample space exists to remain arguably within the safe har-
bor. A strict examination of the statutory language of this first
prong suggests that an issuer potentially could retain its pro-
tected status by disclosing only a few of several important factors
that could cause a material difference between the actual and
predicted results.82 Even deliberate omission of one or more im-
portant factors appears not to subject the issuer to private liabil-
ity, since some important factors would still be identified, just
not all of them.83 Apparently, an issuer could even omit the most
likely factors and still be protected, provided that the factors
which the issuer does state are important.84
Similarly, the Act does not explicitly require that the issuer
identify the factor which ultimately causes a material difference
between projected and actual results.85 This is reasonable, since
when a company makes a forward-looking statement it often will
not know what later will become the ultimate causing factor.
The ultimate causing factor of a material difference, however,
would seem to fit well within the common definition of the word
"important." In such a case, the causing factor would be impor-
tant and yet, as discussed above, since not all important factors
need be identified, the issuer could still deliberately fail to dis-
close even a known causing factor. Upon engaging in such
analysis, one begins to see how the Act's plain meaning is not so
plain.
To complicate matters further, a cautionary statement may
not be "meaningful," as the word is commonly defined, if the
statement does not include the ultimate causing factor or at least
the most likely factors. Also unclear under the Act is the result
PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 750 (1995) codified at 15
U.S.C. §77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 27A(c)(1)(A)(i) to 1933
Act); id. sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 754 (1995), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i)
(1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 21E(c)(1)(A)(i) to 1934 Act).
83 See Coffee, Emerging Issues, supra note 81, at 35.
" But see Greenberg et al., supra note 72, at 7 (asserting that issuer should
still make good faith effort to disclose all important factors); Phillip D. Parker, The
New Safe Harbor For Forward-Looking Statements, in SWEEPING REFORM:
LITIGATING AND BESPEAKING CAUTION UNDER THE NEW SEcuRITIEs LAW 269, 285-
86 (Prac. L. Inst. ed., 1996) (arguing that "[sitating that there is no requirement to
disclose 'all' factors is simply not the same as stating that the 'most important' fac-
tor need not be disclosed.").
85 But see Greenburg et al., supra note 72, at 7 (suggesting that issuer should
still make good faith effort).
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of identifring a factor in the forward-looking statement, but not
mentioning that its potential risk is known to be substantial.86
The Act seemingly affords safe harbor protection to the mere
mention of a known substantial risk. What actually constitutes
meaningful disclosure of important factors remains uncertain,
particularly since the trend of the Supreme Court is to give little
or no weight to the Conference Committee's stated intentions ab-
sent ambiguity or absurdity in the legislation. Such an atmos-
phere of uncertainty is not likely to encourage companies to dis-
close information. As long as this uncertainty remains, a
company risks exposing itself to liability by releasing informa-
tion in reliance on the Act.
Additionally, the Committee indicates that under the first
prong, courts should consider the cautionary statement, but not
the state of mind of the person making the statement.87 A plain
meaning analysis, however, reveals that there is no textual basis
in the Act for the Committee's assertion. Contrary to the Con-
ference Report, an examination of the issuer's state of mind may
be needed in order to determine whether the first prong's re-
quirements are met.8 Depending on the interpretation of the
words "important" and "immaterial," the issuer's state of mind at
the time of the statement could be considered relevant to
whether the cautionary statement was actually meaningful. No
basis exists, therefore, for the Committee's claim that courts
should not examine it. 9
Further ambiguity arises when an issuer learns that infor-
mation provided when the forward-looking statement was made,
though correct at the time, has subsequently become incorrect.
There is no duty under the PSLRA to update a forward-looking
statement.91 A close reading of this language indicates that the
" See Coffee, Safe Harbor, supra note 46, at 6 (asserting that SEC should
promulgate rule addressing issue posed by cautionary language which identifies risk
factor but omits disclosing that risk is very substantial).
87 H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 104-369, at 44 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N.
730, 743.
"' See supra notes 70-72, 75, 87 and accompanying text (discussing Committee
Report).
e See Coffee, Emerging Issues, supra note 81, at 35 (asserting that issuer's
state of mind could be "highly relevant" to whether statement provided meaningful
cautionary information or was deceptive, misleading statement).
' Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Securities Litigation Reform Law, N.Y.
L.J., Dec. 21, 1995, at 6; Coffee, Safe Harbor, supra note 46, at 6.
" The Act indicates that "[nothing in this section shall impose upon any per-
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Act does not declare that there is no duty to update but, instead,
that the Act itself does not impose such a duty where one is not
otherwise present. In addition, the Act does not prohibit such a
duty from being imposed by other applicable law.92
A similar question which arises is whether an issuer must
correct a forward-looking statement that the issuer later learns
was false when made. A distinction could be raised between
"updating" a statement and "correcting" it, where updating
would refer to a statement correct when made, and correcting
would refer to a statement that was false when made. The Act
does not specifically address correcting a previously issued
statement. Therefore, it appears that while the Act imposes no
duty to update a forward-looking statement, liability may arise
for failure to correct it.
Pursuant to the second prong of the safe harbor, an issuer
who is a natural person is protected if the plaintiff fails to prove
that the issuer made the forward-looking statement with actual
knowledge that it was false or misleading.93 Where the issuer is
an entity, the plaintiff must prove that the statement was made
by or with approval of an executive who had actual knowledge
that the statement was false or misleading.94 The Act is ambigu-
ous as to the consequences of releasing a forward-looking state-
ment on behalf of a corporation when the speaker does not have
appropriate approval.95 Under the plain meaning of the Act,
there appears to be no duty to correct the unapproved statement.
It appears that the safe harbor would still apply to a statement
which is known by the entity to be false. The same result ap-
pears likely for a projection made by a natural person which the
son a duty to update a forward-looking statement." PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec.
102, 109 Stat. 737, 751 (1995) codified at 15 U.S.C. §77z-2(d) (1994 & Supp. 1995)
(adding section 27A(d) to 1933 Act); id. sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 755 (1995), codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(d) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 21E(d) to 1934 Act).
92 Examples of such law include the general anti-fraud provisions of § 10(b) of
the 1933 Act and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.
93 PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 750 (1995) codified at 15
U.S.C. §77z-2(c)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 27A(c)(1)(B) to 1933 Act);
id. sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 754 (1995), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B) (1994 &
Supp. 1995) (adding section 21E(c)(1)(B) to 1934 Act).
PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 750 (1995) codified at 15
U.S.C. §77z-2(c)(1)(B)(ii) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 27A(c)(1)(B)(ii) to 1933
Act); id. sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 754 (1995), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B)(ii)
(1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 78u-5(c)(1)(B)(ii) to 1934 Act).
" Note that the speaker is still potentially liable under basic misrepresentation
theory, which is not protected by the Act's safe harbor.
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person later learns was false when made. Since the plaintiff
could not prove that the statement was made with actual knowl-
edge that it was false or misleading, the statement would remain
protected.
B. Potential Problems
In addition to the numerous ambiguities which arise from a
plain meaning analysis of the Act, two potential problems are
readily apparent. 96 In no unequivocal terms, the PSLRA allows
individuals to disseminate information they know to be false by
surrounding such information with cautionary language. Addi-
tionally, the Act allows individuals to escape liability by avoiding
actual knowledge of the truth or falsity of forward-looking
statements, even in the absence of cautionary language.
A significant problem arising from a plain meaning exami-
nation of the Act is that it creates what some experts have called
a "license to lie."97 Strict interpretation of the safe harbor provi-
"' A separate and distinct problem arises since the PSLRA applies only to pri-
vate plaintiffs and does not restrict SEC action. Consequently, Congress may have
wasted its efforts. In light of the continuing presence of the SEC as an enforcement
mechanism, the PSLRA accomplishes few practical benefits for either companies or
investors. A plain meaning interpretation of the Act could easily cause it to self de-
struct. There is little incentive for companies to disclose information because the
SEC may still bring suit. Coffee, Safe Harbor, supra note 46, at 6 (noting that SEC
and NASD enforcement powers remain under Rule 10b-5). Similarly, investors
should be wary to rely on disseminating information because of the license to lie. As
this result is neither ambiguous nor absurd, courts must adhere to the statutory
language and interpret the Act in such a way that it spins its own wheels.
An obvious and important feature of the PSLRA is that it applies only to pri-
vate causes of action. Regardless of how the Actes several ambiguities and problems
are resolved, nothing in the Act will diminish the authority of the SEC to bring an
action against a company. This remains true even if the company is well within the
new safe harbor protecting it from private suit. Knowing that it is not completely
safe from potential liability will hardly encourage a company to disclose a great deal
more information.
Congress, it seems, does not trust the private citizen who would otherwise
maintain a valid cause of action against a company. Limiting the private causes of
action opens the door to potential abuse, and will force many shareholders to sit idly
back and hope that the SEC decides to bring a cause of action to protect their rights.
Therefore, who truly benefits from Congress' enactment of the PSLRA? Private
plaintiffs will lose at least some of their options when faced with securities viola-
tions. Additionally, investors still cannot safely rely on disclosed information be-
cause of the license to lie and the immense burden of proving actual knowledge.
Companies are not truly afforded protection when they disclose information because
the potential for SEC action remains. Members of Congress, on the other hand, can
return to their constituencies boasting of finally reforming private litigation.
97 The term "license to lie" is borrowed from Coffee, Safe Harbor, supra note
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sion shows its two prongs to be set forth in the disjunctive. A
forward-looking statement is protected either if it is accompanied
by meaningful cautionary statements or if the plaintiff fails to
prove that the statement was made with actual knowledge that
it was false or misleading.98 Consequently, a forward-looking
statement that is known to be untrue can be protected under the
safe harbor by the presence of cautionary language. This does
little to encourage public investment in a company, for any
statement accompanied by statutorily sufficient cautionary lan-
guage might be a blatant lie, and yet remain protected by the
safe harbor.99
Even if a court considered the section ambiguous or absurd,
and found it appropriate to consider legislative history, the Con-
ference Committee itself emphasizes that the two prongs are set
forth in the disjunctive."0 It further states definitively that,
"[fiorward-looking statements will have safe harbor protection if
they are accompanied by a meaningful cautionary statement."1
The Committee then claims, however, that a cautionary state-
ment is not covered by the safe harbor if it misstates historical
facts. ' The Act's language does not support the Committee's
last assertion, for it appears to provide companies with a license
to lie even in the form of a misstatement, so long as the lie is ac-
companied by cautionary statements. Perhaps this is just a dis-
tinction made between historical facts and forward-looking
statements. More likely, however, the Committee is attempting
to put its own spin on the statutory language. If the Court re-
mains true to its plain meaning approach, it will ignore the
Committee's pronouncement. Either way, a license to lie still
exists as a result of the Act's disjunctive phrasing of the two
prongs. When an issuer can receive safe harbor protection for an
46, at 6.
98 PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 750 (1995) codified at 15
U.S.C. §77z-2(c)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 27A(c)(1) to 1933 Act); id.
sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 754 (1995), codified at 15 U.S.C. §78u-5(c)(1) (1994 & Supp.
1995) (adding section 21E(c)(1) to 1934 Act).
99 But see Nicholas E. Chimicles, The Future of Securities Litigation Under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, in 935 FINANCIAL SERVICES
LITIGATION 375, 390 (Pract. L. Inst. ed., 1996) (asserting that safe harbor is not
likely to constitute 'license to lie' in light of corporate goals of investors and securi-
ties analyst credibility).
100 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-369, at 43, 44 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 742-43.
11 Id. at 44, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 743.
102 Id-
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outright lie, any disclosure is far from meaningful.
Another potential problem arises from the safe harbor's ac-
tual knowledge requirement."3 Examining the language of the
second prong, which can apply even when no cautionary lan-
guage accompanies a forward-looking statement, shows that the
statement still receives safe harbor protection if the plaintiff
does not prove that the statement was made with actual knowl-
edge that it was false or misleading. Note, further, that the bur-
den is placed upon the private plaintiff to prove actual knowl-
edge by the company."M Thus, under this prong, the required
level of culpability is not recklessness but, rather, the heightened
standard of actual knowledge."5 In all practicality, meeting such
a burden can be nearly impossible, given the likelihood of an un-
cooperative defendant.
While the Act itself does not define or specifically adopt an-
other definition of actual knowledge, this level of culpability is
clearly quite high. Accordingly, even in the absence of caution-
ary language, a recklessly issued forward-looking statement is
protected from private liability by this second prong. Potentially
liable company representatives might, therefore, make efforts to
shield themselves from liability by purposefully remaining igno-
rant regarding specific instances of false statements.
CONCLUSION
The language of the safe harbor provision of the Private Se-
curities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 exemplifies the Act's im-
precise, ambiguous, and problematic nature. One thing which is
clear from the Act is that Congress has not learned the lesson
that the Supreme Court has repeatedly tried to teach. The Court
has routinely relied on strict interpretation of securities laws,
each time conveying a message to Congress that its language
should be clear and conform to commonly accepted definitions.
Only where the text is ambiguous or absurd may a court turn to
legislative history for guidance. Unfortunately, the Conference
'03 PSLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 750 (1995) codified at 15
U.S.C. §77z-2(c)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. 1995) (adding section 27A(c)(1)(B) to 1933 Act);
id. sec. 102, 109 Stat. 737, 754 (1995), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(B) (1994 &
Supp. 1995) (adding section 21E(c)(1)(B) to 1934 Act).M See, e.g., Block & Hoff, supra note 90, at 5 (asserting that burden is on
plaintiff to prove actual knowledge).
5 Coffee, Safe Harbor, supra note 46, at 5.
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report is of little use, as it often differs significantly from the text
of the Act.
The Court fails to realize the near impossibility of trying to
teach Congress such a lesson. The Act will result in uncertainty
and litigation rather than an immediate, effective, and substan-
tive reform of securities law. Lower courts will be burdened with
resolving the uncertainties and framing their opinions according
to their respective views as to what is "plainly" set forth in the
Act. Potential private plaintiffs will lose at least some right to
bring an otherwise valid action. Companies will be able to shield
themselves from liability by exploiting the license to lie and ac-
tual knowledge provisions of the safe harbor which likely result
from a plain meaning interpretation of the Act. Whether Con-
gress will finally learn its lesson remains to be seen.
Steven J. Spencer*
" The author thanks Claire Moore Dickerson for her invaluable assistance with
earlier drafts of this Note.
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